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INTRODUCTION AND
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1
This Court has requested supplemental briefing on
―[w]hether and under what circumstances the Alien Tort
Statute (‗ATS‘), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations
occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than
the United States.‖ The answer is that courts may hear
such actions when—and only when—they are brought
against U.S. citizens.
As this Court recognized in Sosa, ―the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action.‖ Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004). The First
Congress enacted the ATS pursuant to Article III‘s grant
of foreign diversity jurisdiction (over controversies between U.S. citizens and foreign citizens) to satisfy the
United States‘ obligation under the law of nations to redress certain torts by Americans against aliens. Properly
understood, the ATS is a jurisdictional statute that applies only to suits by aliens against U.S. citizens. Because
all of the parties to this case—whether individuals or corporations—are aliens, federal courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction under both the ATS and Article III. This
provides an independently dispositive, threshold reason
to affirm the Second Circuit‘s dismissal of petitioners‘
claims.
Congress enacted the ATS to redress injuries to aliens inflicted by American citizens—through ordinary
torts involving injury to the alien‘s person or personal
1

No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and
no person, other than the amici and their counsel, contributed money to its preparation or submission. The parties have consented to
this filing.
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property. Such torts violated the law of nations as understood in 1789, and the law of nations obligated the
United States to redress them. If it failed to do so, the
United States would have become an accomplice to its citizens‘ wrongdoing and subjected itself to reprisals by foreign nations. The First Congress enacted the ATS to
provide a federal forum for alien tort claims against
American citizens, thereby fulfilling the United States‘
obligation to redress such harms. It did not enact the
statute to resolve disputes between non-citizens—even if
they happened to touch on matters that, today, might be
considered violations of modern international law.
In 1789, most torts capable of triggering jurisdiction
under the ATS would have occurred on U.S. soil. It
would be a mistake, however, to say that the ATS could
never apply ―extraterritorially‖ to injuries inflicted by
Americans abroad. The ATS is not a prescriptive regulation subject to extraterritoriality analysis. It is simply a
jurisdictional statute. Courts routinely apply jurisdictional statutes to hear tort and other claims arising
abroad. When, for example, federal courts hear actions
arising abroad under the general foreign diversity statute, no one contends that they are improperly applying
the diversity statute ―extraterritorially.‖ Like the diversity statute, the ATS is purely jurisdictional and presents
no question of whether U.S. substantive law should govern conduct abroad.
The key limitation on ATS jurisdiction was not that
the action had to arise in U.S. territory, but that the action had to be against a U.S. citizen. In 1789, the United
States was a small nation surrounded by European powers, territorial borders were uncertain and disputed, and
violence across borders threatened the security of the
new nation. Under the law of nations, the United States
had an obligation to redress violence by U.S. citizens

3
against foreigners regardless of whether it occurred
within or outside U.S. territory.
Amici are law professors who, prior to the Court‘s
grant of certiorari in this case, spent several years conducting scholarly research into the original meaning of
the ATS. Anthony J. Bellia Jr. is a Professor of Law and
Concurrent Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. Bradford R. Clark is the William
Cranch Professor of Law at The George Washington
University Law School. Both teach and write in the areas of federal jurisdiction, constitutional law, and foreign
relations. Together, they have published important
scholarship that sheds new light on the history and meaning of the ATS. Their comprehensive article, The Alien
Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev.
445 (2011) (hereafter Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute),
has been cited by the parties and amici in this case, as
well as by lower courts construing the statute. Professors Bellia and Clark submit this brief to share their historical research and findings with the Court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. In Sosa, this Court made clear that the ATS
should be construed according to the understanding of
the First Congress. The ATS, as originally understood,
extended federal court jurisdiction to suits by aliens
against U.S. citizens for intentional torts involving force
against their person or personal property. Such torts violated the law of nations and required the United States to
redress the harm or become responsible for the violation.
Because the ATS is solely a jurisdictional statute, the
presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply.
The ATS did not confer, however, jurisdiction over actions by one alien against another, regardless of where
the tort occurred.
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In 1789, the United States was a weak nation seeking
to avoid conflict with foreign powers. At the time, the law
of nations required a nation whose citizen committed an
intentional tort of force against a friendly alien to redress
the injury in one of three ways: by criminal prosecution,
by extradition, or by providing a civil remedy. The failure to redress a tort in violation of the law of nations gave
the offended nation just cause for war. Americans committed numerous acts of violence against aliens immediately following the War of Independence. The states
proved unable or unwilling to redress such violence, leaving the United States responsible and vulnerable to reprisals.
As a consequence, the Founders authorized federal
jurisdiction over several categories of cases likely to implicate the law of nations. The First Congress enacted
criminal and civil statutes to redress harms inflicted by
American citizens against diplomats and other foreigners, and gave federal courts jurisdiction over cases involving ambassadors and admiralty matters, as well as
diversity cases involving an alien where the claim exceeded $500. Had Congress stopped there, however, the
amount-in-controversy requirement would have denied
ordinary aliens who suffered intentional harms at the
hands of Americans access to federal court. The United
States‘ consequent responsibility for such harms would
have subjected the weak and embryonic nation to reprisals or wars that it could ill afford.
The ATS filled this gap by extending federal jurisdiction to ―all cases where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States,‖ without regard to the amount in controversy.
Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77. The ATS operated as a fail-safe provision: It permitted foreign nationals to sue American citizens in federal court for torts
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that, if not redressed, would provide other countries with
a casus belli against the United States. By authorizing a
self-executing method of civil redress in federal court, the
United States avoided military reprisals for the misconduct of its citizens and signaled its intent to comply with
its obligations under the law of nations.
The First Congress had no similar incentive to authorize federal courts to adjudicate tort suits between aliens. Unlike violence against aliens by American citizens,
violence by aliens against other aliens was not imputed to
the United States under the law of nations. Indeed, if a
claim between aliens arose outside the United States, adjudication by federal courts could have interfered with
the territorial sovereignty of other nations—itself a violation of the law of nations. Reading the ATS to authorize
suits between aliens in federal court—especially where,
as here, the conduct occurred on foreign soil—would undermine the statute‘s objectives by impinging on the territorial sovereignty of other nations and risking serious
foreign relations consequences.
II. The original meaning of the ATS is consistent
with Article III‘s limits on the federal judicial power. In
arguing over extraterritoriality, the parties erroneously
assume that the ATS created a federal rule of decision.
The ATS, however, ―is a jurisdictional statute creating no
new causes of action.‖ Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. This jurisdictional statute was ―enacted on the understanding that
the common law would provide a cause of action,‖ id., and
in 1789 Congress specifically directed federal courts to
apply state common law. Accordingly, the ATS provides
no basis for ―arising under‖ jurisdiction, and can only
plausibly be understood as a jurisdictional grant pursuant to Article III‘s foreign diversity clause. Such jurisdiction requires that at least one party to the case be a
U.S. citizen; it provides no authority to hear suits be-
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tween aliens. This reading of the ATS avoids many of the
concerns raised by the Court in Sosa in connection with
with an expansive reading of the statute.
Both historical evidence and this Court‘s precedent
make clear that constitutional authorization for the ATS
must be found in the foreign diversity clause. This Court
has never considered the ―law of nations‖ to qualify, in
and of itself, as federal law. Rather, when the ATS was
enacted, the law of nations was understood to be either
general law or part of the common law received by the
states. Nor did the ATS itself create a new body of substantive federal law capable of supporting ―arising under‖ jurisdiction. Plaintiffs invoking ATS jurisdiction
looked to other sources of law to find the cause of action
and governing rules of decision—specifically, the Process
Act of 1789 and section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
which instructed federal courts to apply the procedural
and substantive common law of the state in which they
sat. State law does not support ―arising under‖ jurisdiction.
III. This case is the proper vehicle for deciding
whether the ATS covers cases solely between aliens. Sosa
did not address this question and does not foreclose a
holding that the ATS extends only to suits against U.S.
citizens. The Court did not consider or decide whether
the statute confers, or Article III permits, jurisdiction
over suits between aliens. A court‘s mere assumption of
jurisdiction without discussion has never been entitled to
precedential effect. Moreover, because Sosa originally
included claims against U.S. defendants, federal courts
had supplemental jurisdiction over related claims between aliens.
The Sosa Court‘s dispositive holding that the plaintiff
had not alleged a tort ―in violation of the law of nations‖
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within the meaning of the statute obviated the need to
examine party-alignment limitations on subject matter
jurisdiction. Moreover, the Court stressed that ATS jurisdiction ―should be undertaken, if at all, with great caution‖ over suits that ―claim a limit on the power of foreign
governments over their own citizens‖ and that seek ―to
hold that a foreign government or its agent has transgressed those limits.‖ 542 U.S. at 727–28.
This case squarely presents the question whether
ATS jurisdiction extends to claims solely between aliens.
The plaintiffs and defendants are all aliens; no U.S. citizen or corporation has ever been a party to the case. Because the issue of party alignment under the ATS is a
question of subject matter jurisdiction, the parties cannot
waive it, and either the Court or a party may raise it anytime. And the question whether the ATS covers suits between aliens is likely to recur; indeed, the issue is squarely presented by the Ninth Circuit‘s recent ruling in Sarei
v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc),
which this Court has held pending disposition of this case.
If the Court decides that the ATS does not confer jurisdiction over suits between aliens, then it will likely
never have to decide the question of corporate liability
under the statute. Today, unlike in 1789, suits by aliens
against U.S. defendants can easily satisfy the amount-incontroversy requirement for foreign diversity jurisdiction. Because almost all lawsuits against U.S. corporations would fall within such jurisdiction, foreign plaintiffs
would almost never have to rely on the ATS.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The History Of The ATS Demonstrates That It
Was Understood to Confer Jurisdiction Only Over
Suits By Aliens Against United States Citizens,
And Not Over Suits Between Aliens.

Recovering the original meaning of the ATS requires
an examination of the legal and historical context in
which it was enacted. As enacted in 1789, the ATS provided that ―the district courts * * * shall [] have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or
the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where
an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.‖ Judiciary Act of
1789, § 9, 1 Stat. at 76–77. The statute‘s text specifies
that the plaintiff must be an alien, but does not mention
the defendant‘s nationality. Nevertheless, read in light of
the diplomatic concerns faced by the First Congress and
the background law of nations principles that give meaning to its text, the statute confers jurisdiction only over
lawsuits by aliens against American citizens for torts in
violation of the law of nations. Such lawsuits were most
likely to involve conduct that occurred within the United
States, but the ATS also granted jurisdiction over lawsuits involving torts of violence by U.S. citizens that occurred abroad. Because the ATS is solely a jurisdictional
statute, the presumption against extraterritoriality does
not apply.
A. The ATS was intended to redress violations of
the law of nations committed by United States
citizens against aliens.
1. ―In 1789, every nation had a duty to redress certain violations of the law of nations committed by its citizens or subjects against other nations or their citizens.‖
Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute 448. Such violations
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included interfering with the rights of ambassadors, violating safe conducts, and impeding neutral use of the high
seas. They also included private intentional torts against
the person or personal property of a citizen of a friendly
nation. Ibid. Failure to provide redress for such misconduct by a citizen against a foreign citizen—whether
through criminal punishment, extradition, or civil liability—provided the offended nation with just cause for war.
The ATS was enacted to remedy this kind of private misconduct against ordinary aliens.
As Emmerich de Vattel, the most cited authority on
the law of nations during the Founding period, explained:
[T]he nation or sovereign, ought not to suffer the
citizens to do an injury to the subjects of another
state, much less to offend the state itself. And
that not only because no sovereign ought to permit those who are under his command to violate
the precepts of the law of nature, which forbids
all injuries; but also because nations ought mutually to respect each other, to abstain from all offense, from all abuse, from all injury, and, in a
word, from every things that may be of prejudice
to others.
1 Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations 144 (1759).
A nation that approved or ratified an injury by one of
its citizens against an alien, either by authorizing it or—
critically—by failing to redress it after the fact, could be
held responsible for that injury: ―The sovereign who refuses to cause a reparation to be made of the damage
caused by his subject, or to punish the guilty, or, in short,
to deliver him up, renders himself in some measure an
accomplice in the injury, and becomes responsible for it.‖
Id. at 145.
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This obligation applied whether the injury was inflicted at home or abroad. Ibid. A nation could redress an injury that its citizen inflicted upon a foreigner abroad by
extraditing the offender to the nation where the offense
occurred. Or it could allow the injured foreigner to bring
a transitory civil action in its own courts where the defendant was domiciled. Ibid.
According to Vattel, a nation‘s failure to redress injuries by its citizens against foreigners through one of these means violated the ―perfect rights‖ of the other nationand gave it just cause for reprisals or war. Such a
right was ―perfect‖ because it was ―accompanied with the
right of using force to make it observed.‖ Id. at 143. As
Blackstone put it, once the injured nation demanded ―satisfaction and justice to be done on the offender,‖ the failure of ―the state to which he belongs‖ to provide redress
rendered that state ―an accomplice or abettor of [its] subject‘s crimes,‖ and drew it into ―the calamities of foreign
war.‖ 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law
of England 68 (1765); see generally Bellia & Clark, Alien
Tort Statute 471–77.
2. The prospect that misconduct by U.S. citizens
against foreigners would draw the United States into war
was more than just a theoretical concern for the First
Congress. The new nation‘s survival depended on maintaining peace with the European powers with which it
shared its original borders. The Founders recognized
that ―maintaining peace required the United States to
redress private offenses to other nations.‖ Bellia &
Clark, Alien Tort Statute 494.
Under the Articles of Confederation, however, the
newly-independent states often failed to meet their obligations under the law of nations. States committed particularly egregious violations of the law of nations by in-
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terfering with the rights of ambassadors. For example,
in the famous Marbois incident, a Pennsylvania state
court convicted a French citizen of assaulting a French
diplomat in Philadelphia, but refused to extradite the
perpetrator as demanded by the French government.
See Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111
(Pa. Ct. Oyer & Terminer 1784). Similarly, in 1787, a
New York city constable created an international incident
by entering the residence of Dutch ambassador van
Berckel with a warrant to arrest a member of his household. The ambassador protested to John Jay, the American foreign affairs secretary, who reported to Congress
that ―the foederal Government does not appear * * * to
be vested with any judicial Powers competent to the
Cognizance and Judgment of such Cases.‖ 34 Journals
of the Continental Congress 1774–1789 109–111 (Roscoe
R. Hill ed. 1937).
Cases affecting ambassadors were important, but
they were not the only—or most frequent—offenses during the Confederation era. More routine incidents involved the states‘ failure to redress ordinary tort injuries
inflicted by their own citizens on aliens:
In the 1780s, state citizens increasingly made violent attacks upon the persons and property of
British subjects in America. Indeed, the president of the Continental Congress, Elias Boudinot,
feared that postwar acts of violence by New York
Whigs against the British were so extreme as
possibly to ―involve us in another War.‖
Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute 501 (quoting Oscar
Zeichner, The Loyalist Problem in New York after the
Revolution, 21 N.Y. Hist. 284, 289 (1940)).
Faced with these continuing breaches of the law of
nations, the Continental Congress in 1781 passed a reso-
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lution imploring states to enact laws to protect foreigners—and specifically to ―authorize suits * * * for damages
by the party injured, and for compensation to the United
States for damage sustained by them from an injury done
to a foreign power by a citizen.‖ Bellia & Clark, Alien
Tort Statute at 496 (quoting 21 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789 1136–37 (Gaillard Hunt ed.
1912)). This plea fell largely on deaf ears. Connecticut
was the only state to enact a civil remedy for injuries
caused by its citizens to foreign subjects. Id. at 504–506.
3. As the Founders gathered in Philadelphia in 1787,
one of their top priorities was to design a new constitution that would enable the United States to meet its obligations under the law of nations. Indeed, when Edmund
Randolph opened the Federal Convention, he lamented
the Confederation‘s inability to prevent or redress ―acts
against a foreign power contrary to the law of nations.‖
He concluded that the Confederation ―therefore [could
not] prevent a war‖ and was fundamentally flawed. 1
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 24–25 (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).
The Framers sought to remedy this problem not only
by centralizing power over foreign relations in the federal
government, but also by establishing an independent federal judiciary that could hear cases likely to implicate the
law of nations. Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R.
Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 Colum.
L. Rev. 1, 37–46 (2009) (hereafter Bellia & Clark, Common Law of Nations). Article III of the new Constitution extended the federal judicial power to ―Cases * * *
arising under Treaties‖; ―Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls‖; ―Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction‖; and ―Controversies * * * between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.‖ U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
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In the Judiciary Act of 1789, the First Congress gave
the newly-established federal courts jurisdiction over important civil cases implicating the law of nations. It
granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over
cases affecting ambassadors, in order to preclude state
adjudication in cases like the Marbois and van Berckel
incidents. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. at
80–81. It also granted the federal courts jurisdiction over
admiralty and maritime cases, id. § 9, 1 Stat. at 77, and
suits where an alien was a party and the amount in controversy exceeded $500, id. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78.
4. Had Congress stopped there, it would have left a
significant gap: Federal courts could not have heard
claims for personal injuries suffered by aliens at the
hands of U.S. citizens resulting in less than $500 in damages.2 The ATS filled this gap by extending jurisdiction
to certain tort claims by aliens with no amount in controversy requirement. ―By authorizing federal court jurisdiction over claims by ‗an alien * * * for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States,‘ the First Congress ensured that the United
States would provide aliens with at least one form of redress for its citizens‘ violations of the law of nations.‖
Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute 515 (quoting Judiciary
Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. at 77).
The ATS‘s reference to torts ―in violation of the law of
nations‖ thus referred to certain ordinary torts that,
when committed by American citizens against aliens,
would trigger the United States‘ duty under the law of
2

At the time, most tort claims would not have satisfied the $500
amount in controversy requirement for foreign diversity jurisdiction.
See Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort
Statute, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 830, 900 (2006).
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nations to provide redress or become responsible for the
violation. This narrow grant of diversity jurisdiction with
no amount-in-controversy requirement was intended to
redress any incident which, if mishandled by a state
court, might trigger international conflict.
In light of this historical context, the ATS is best read
to confer jurisdiction only over intentional tort claims by
aliens against United States citizens. The phrase ―a tort
only in violation of the law of nations‖ most reasonably
referred to an intentional injury by an American citizen
to an alien‘s person or personal property.3 ―When US citizens committed torts against such aliens, they violated
the law of nations by threatening the peace of nations. In
such cases, the victim‘s nation would have expected the
United States—in accordance with the law of nations—to
redress the injury or become responsible itself for the violation.‖ Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute 516.
Because the United States had few extradition treaties in 1789, and because the apparatus for federal criminal prosecutions was yet to be established, the First
Congress chose to satisfy the United States‘ obligation in
the only remaining way permitted by the law of nations—
by giving federal courts jurisdiction to provide civil rem-

3

Commentators like Blackstone and Vattel distinguished between
forceful, violent misconduct, such as battery and false imprisonment,
and private wrongs committed without force, such as slander. Bellia
& Clark, Alien Tort Statute 517. Because only the former were considered ―violations of the peace‖ giving rise to a duty of redress, ―‗a
tort in violation of the law of nations‘ most reasonably would have
been understood to mean an intentional act of force against an alien‘s
person or property that subjected the transgressor‘s nation to justified retaliation under the law of nations if it failed to provide appropriate redress.‖ Ibid.
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edies to aliens without regard to the amount in controversy.
5. This reading of the phrase ―a tort only in violation
of the law of nations‖ is both broader and narrower than
that put forward in Sosa, where this Court concluded that
the ATS encompassed a narrow class of intentional torts
closely analogous to the three international crimes recognized by Blackstone—violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. 542
U.S. at 724.
To be sure, the three Blackstone crimes were important means by which England sought to comply with
its various obligations under the law of nations. The
First Congress likewise criminalized the three offenses
Blackstone identified. Act of April 30, 1790, 1 Stat. 112.
The ATS, however, was designed to provide a civil forum
to satisfy a distinct obligation: to redress violence committed by Americans against ordinary foreigners. English courts used their common law jurisdiction to redress
such torts in violation of the law of nations committed by
British subjects. The states received the common law,
but bias against aliens prevented state courts from sufficiently redressing torts of this kind. The First Congress
enacted the ATS in order to give federal courts the ability
to do so. See generally Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute
477–84, 510–24.
In another sense, our reading of the ATS is narrower
than that put forward in Sosa. If torts corresponding to
the three Blackstone offenses included claims by one alien against another, then they would fall outside the jurisdiction conferred by the ATS (although they might fall
within admiralty or ambassadorial jurisdiction). Because
the United States was responsible only for certain torts
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committed by U.S. citizens against aliens, jurisdiction
under the ATS was limited accordingly.
B. The ATS was not intended to cover lawsuits by
aliens against other aliens.
1. Understood in its original context, the language of
the ATS did not encompass claims between aliens, because such claims did not involve ―violation[s] of the law
of nations‖ from the perspective of the United States.
The First Congress used that phrase to refer to wrongs
by the United States or its citizens that triggered U.S.
responsibility under the law of nations to provide redress
or risk retaliation by the victim‘s nation.
The First Congress had no reason to extend federal
jurisdiction to tort claims between two aliens, especially
claims arising outside the United States. The law of nations not only did not impute such torts to the United
States; it arguably prohibited adjudication of alien-alien
tort claims arising abroad as an infringement on the territorial sovereignty of other nations. Extending the ATS
to suits between aliens would have contradicted the First
Congress‘s goal of minimizing diplomatic conflict.
The law of nations as understood in 1789 did not attribute to a nation a tort committed by one alien against
another alien, even if the tort occurred within its territory. Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute 519. Consequently, the United States did not have the same obligation to
redress such violence as it did to redress violence by its
own citizen. At most, the United States had an obligation
to provide a fair hearing for claims between aliens arising
in the United States so as to avoid a denial of justice. See
id. at 476. Adjudication of such claims in state court fully
satisfied this obligation. Ibid. Whereas state courts were
notorious for discriminating against aliens when they
sued Americans, there is no evidence that states failed to
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adjudicate suits between aliens fairly or that foreign nations raised any objections in diplomatic discussions with
the United States. Id. at 520. Thus, authorizing federal
jurisdiction over alien-versus-alien suits was both unnecessary and potentially dangerous.
2. Indeed, extending the ATS to include tort claims
between aliens arising on foreign soil—a routine scenario
in modern ATS cases—would affirmatively undermine
the statute‘s original objectives.
The law of nations imposed no obligation on the
United States to provide aliens with a forum for adjudicating claims against one another that arose in foreign
territory. Failure to adjudicate such claims would have
neither placed the United States in breach of the law of
nations nor subjected it to reprisals by foreign nations.
Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute 529.
To the contrary, vesting jurisdiction in federal courts
over claims with no connection to the United States or its
citizens would have risked violating the territorial sovereignty of the nation in which the acts occurred—inviting
the very diplomatic conflict or military reprisals that the
ATS was designed to prevent.
Under the law of nations, as understood by the First
Congress, every nation had sovereign authority within its
own territory:
It is a manifest consequence of the liberty and independence of nations, that all have a right to be
governed as they think proper, and that none
have the least authority to interfere in the government of another state. Of all the rights that
can belong to a nation, sovereignty is, doubtless,
the most precious, and that which others ought
the most scrupulously to respect, if they would
not do it an injury.
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1 Vattel, supra, at 138. As a consequence, Vattel explained, a dispute arising on foreign soil should be resolved only by courts of the place where the action arose
or where the defendant was domiciled. Id. at 154.
Under the law of nations as understood in 1789, ―nations declined to exercise jurisdiction over actions that
were local to another nation—in other words, within that
nation‘s exclusive territorial sovereignty.‖ Bellia &
Clark, Alien Tort Statute 484–85. This principle was especially important because infringing on another nation‘s
territorial sovereignty gave that nation just cause for
war. Ibid.
English cases from this time confirmed this principle.4
In 1859, a New York court observed that ―no case will be
found in the whole course of English jurisprudence in
which an action for an injury to the person, inflicted by
one foreigner upon another in a foreign country, was ever
held to be maintainable in an English court.‖ Molony v.
Dows, 8 Abb. Pr. 316, 329–30 (N.Y. Ct. Com. Pleas 1859).
In light of these background principles, construing
the ATS to confer jurisdiction over suits between aliens
for conduct that occurred abroad would turn the statute
on its head. The United States had no responsibility under the law of nations to provide redress for such wrongs,
and adjudicating foreign conflicts could infringe on the
territorial sovereignty of other nations and provoke the

4

See Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1030 (K.B. 1774) (Lord
Mansfield opines that English courts had no jurisdiction over action
arising abroad between foreigners); Vernor v. Elvies, 6 Dict. of Dec.
4788 (1610) (Scot.) (Scottish court refuses to hear action between two
Englishman arising outside Scotland).

19
very type of diplomatic conflict that the ATS was designed to avoid.5
3. The concern about infringing another nation‘s territorial sovereignty did not apply to ATS jurisdiction over
claims by aliens against U.S. citizens, even if the claims
arose outside the United States. ―In contrast to alienalien claims arising abroad, a nation‘s courts did not implicate other nations‘ territorial sovereignty under the
law of nations when they heard actions by aliens against
their own citizens.‖ Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute
492. Jurisdiction over such transitory actions was commonplace because it was difficult to obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant outside his domicile.
Arguments against the extraterritorial application of
the ATS start from the mistaken premise that the statute
not only confers jurisdiction, but also creates a federal
rule of decision to govern cases within that jurisdiction.
But merely exercising jurisdiction over a tort case did not
require federal courts to apply substantive federal law
5

Some proponents of a broad interpretation of the ATS erroneously
cite two early cases—Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795),
and Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793)—as supporting ATS jurisdiction over cases between aliens. Bolchos is inapposite
because the relevant claim was by a French citizen against a U.S. citizen. Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute 459. In Moxon, the Court
declined to exercise admiralty jurisdiction over a British ship owner‘s
claim that his ship was illegally captured by a French vessel in U.S.
waters. In dicta, the Court noted that the case also did not fall within
ATS jurisdiction because ―[i]t cannot be called a suit for a tort only,
when the property, as well as the damages for the supposed trespass,
are sought for.‖ 17 F. Cas. at 948. It is hard to see how the court‘s
decision not to exercise ATS jurisdiction can be taken to support
ATS jurisdiction over suits between aliens—an issue the court neither decided nor discussed.
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extraterritorially. The ATS ―is a jurisdictional statute
creating no new causes of action.‖ Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
Pre-existing common law causes of action provided its
remedies. As the Court explained in Sosa, ―[t]he jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the
understanding that the common law would provide a
cause of action for the modest number of international
law violations with a potential for personal liability at the
time.‖ Ibid. Although the Court assumed that federal
courts would apply the common law in ATS cases, it did
not identify the precise source of such law.
In the Process Act of 1789, the First Congress instructed federal courts, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, to apply ―the forms of writs and executions‖ then in
use by state courts. Process Act of 1789 § 2, 1 Stat. at 93–
94; see also Process Act of 1792, § 2, 1 Stat. at 276. This
meant that, in ATS cases, federal courts would employ
ordinary state common law forms of action for redressing
tort injuries—the same forms of action they used in the
exercise of their diversity jurisdiction. Section 34 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 further provided ―[t]hat the laws of
the several states * * * shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United
States in cases where they apply.‖ Judiciary Act of 1789,
§ 34, 1 Stat. at 92. These provisions required a federal
court exercising jurisdiction under the ATS to apply the
common law of the state in which it sat to redress claims
by aliens for torts in violation of the law of nations.
Similarly, exercising jurisdiction over a foreign diversity case that arose abroad did not require a federal court
to apply American law extraterritorially. In 1789, the
place where the defendant was domiciled was often the
only place where the plaintiff could obtain personal jurisdiction. Under well-accepted choice of law principles,
federal and state courts adjudicating transitory torts
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would have applied local forms of proceeding, but the
substantive law of the place where the tort was committed.
The general presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law began as a way of respecting the law
of nations by preventing intrusions on the territorial sovereignty of foreign states. The same respect for the law
of nations not only permitted, but required, the United
States to redress injuries inflicted by its citizens against
aliens outside the United States. Opening federal courts
to aliens injured by Americans abroad ensured that the
United States would comply with its obligation under the
law of nations to redress such injuries.
An early opinion by Attorney General William Bradford confirms this understanding. In 1794, American citizens joined a French fleet in attacking the British Sierra
Leone Company‘s colony on the coast of Africa. 1 Op.
Att‘y Gen. 57, 58 (July 6, 1795) (William Bradford). Bradford concluded that because the acts took place outside
the United States, the actors could not be criminally
―prosecuted or punished for them by the United States.‖
Ibid.6 Hence, ATS jurisdiction was crucial if the United
States was to redress such injuries. Bradford explained:
there can be no doubt that the company or individuals who have been injured by these acts of
hostility have a remedy by a civil suit in the
courts of the United States; jurisdiction being expressly given to these courts in all cases where an

6

At the time, the law of nations prohibited countries from extending
their criminal jurisdiction to offenses that occurred within the territory of another nation. See Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute 482–
83.
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alien sues for a tort only, in violation of the laws of
nations, or a treaty of the United States.
Id. at 59.
When the ATS was enacted, violence by U.S. citizens
in nearby borderlands—such as British Canada or Spanish territory adjacent to the Mississippi—was of more
immediate concern than acts across the ocean. Bellia &
Clark, Alien Tort Statute 501-03. Nonetheless, for hostile acts committed by U.S. citizens in any foreign territory, the ATS often provided the only reliable means for
the United States to redress the injury and discharge its
responsibility under the law of nations.
II. The Limits Of Article III Diversity Jurisdiction
Preclude Applying The ATS To Suits Between Aliens.
During the first oral argument in this case, Justice
Alito asked a simple, but essential, question: ―[W]hat‘s
the constitutional basis for a lawsuit like this, where an
alien is suing an alien?‖ Tr. at 51:13–15. The answer is
just as simple, and it is dispositive: There is no constitutional basis for applying the ATS to suits between aliens.
Article III‘s authorization of foreign diversity jurisdiction
does not extend to controversies between aliens, and the
ATS is properly understood as a limited grant of diversity jurisdiction to hear certain claims by aliens against
Americans. The ATS did not create or incorporate any
substantive cause of action as a matter of federal law.
Thus, there is no ―arising under‖ jurisdiction over suits
brought under the ATS for violations of the law of nations.
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A. Suits between aliens are outside the scope of
the foreign diversity clause.
Article III‘s foreign diversity clause authorizes federal court jurisdiction over ―Controversies * * * between
a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.‖ U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. While
controversies between U.S. citizens and foreign nationals
fall squarely within this jurisdictional grant, disputes between or among aliens do not. See generally Bellia &
Clark, Alien Tort Statute 526–528.
Although this Court has not yet addressed whether
the ATS should be construed to include suits between aliens, it early on addressed the parallel issue raised by the
general alien diversity provision. Its resolution of this issue is especially probative because both jurisdictional
provisions were enacted together in the First Judiciary
Act. Section 11 of the Act conferred federal jurisdiction
over suits ―where the matter in dispute exceeds * * * five
hundred dollars, and * * * an alien is a party.‖ Judiciary
Act of 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. at 78. Although that language—
like the language of the ATS—did not expressly exclude
suits between two aliens, federal courts interpreted the
provision to exclude such suits.
In Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (1800),
this Court held that Section 11 must be read narrowly in
light of Article III:
[T]he 11th section of the judiciary act can, and
must, receive a construction, consistent with the
constitution. It says, it is true, in general terms,
that the Circuit Court shall have cognizance of
suits ―where an alien is a party;‖ but as the legislative power of conferring jurisdiction on the federal Courts, is, in this respect, confined to suits
between citizens and foreigners, we must so ex-
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pound the terms of the law, as to meet the case,
―where, indeed, an alien is one party,‖ but a citizen is the other.
Id. at 14 (emphasis in original).7
These reasons apply equally to the ATS. Although
the ATS, like Section 11, does not expressly exclude suits
between aliens, it rests on the same Article III jurisdictional authorization—controversies ―between a State, or
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or subjects.‖ U.S. Const. art III, § 2 , cl. 1. Article III provides
no other general warrant for jurisdiction over tort claims
between aliens—even for violations of the law of nations—unless such claims have been enacted into positive
federal law, such as by statute or treaty. The ATS, which
is purely ―jurisdictional,‖ Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712, is not
such a statute.
―Congress may not expand the jurisdiction of the
federal courts beyond the bounds established by the Constitution.‖ Verlinden, B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
461 U.S. 480, 491 (1983). Because Article III‘s foreign diversity clause does not extend the federal judicial power
to controversies between aliens, and because the law of
nations only required the United States to remedy harms
inflicted by its own citizens against aliens, the ATS is
most naturally read—like Section 11—to confer jurisdiction only over suits between aliens and U.S. citizens.
B. Suits under the ATS do not arise under the
“Laws of the United States.”
Because Article III‘s foreign diversity clause does not
extend to suits between aliens, this Court could uphold
7

See also Hodgson v. Browerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809);
Montalet v. Murray, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 46, 47 (1807).
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jurisdiction over such suits only by concluding that they
constitute cases ―arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority.‖ U.S. Const. art.
III, § 2, cl. 1. This Court held in Sosa, however, that ―the
ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of
action.‖ 542 U.S. at 724. Rather, the pre-existing ―common law would provide a cause of action.‖ Id.
At the time the ATS was enacted, rules derived from
the law of nations were considered a form of either general law or state common law. But neither form of law
supported ―arising under‖ jurisdiction: The First Congress would not have understood an alien claim ―for a tort
only in violation of the law of nations‖ to arise under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
1. In Sosa, the Court stressed that the ATS is a
purely jurisdictional statute that creates ―no new causes
of action.‖ See, e.g., 542 U.S. at 729 (―All Members of the
Court agree that [the ATS] is only jurisdictional.‖). If the
relevant cause of action was not ―new,‖ then it would not
have been a federal cause of action because the federal
government only came into being with the ratification of
the Constitution in 1789.
We agree that the First Congress expected federal
courts to apply the common law to redress torts committed by Americans against aliens, but that expectation did
not transform the common law into federal law. To the
contrary, the Process Act and Section 34 of the Judiciary
Act instructed federal courts to apply the forms of proceeding used by state courts and the laws of the several
states as rules of decision.
Moreover, a ―purely jurisdictional‖ statute—that is,
one that seeks to do ―nothing more than grant jurisdiction over a particular category of cases‖—does not confer
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jurisdiction on the federal courts pursuant to the ―arising
under clause.‖ Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 496 (quoting The
Propeller Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
443, 451 (1852)). ―This reasoning is obviously correct: a
‗purely jurisdictional statute‘ granting jurisdiction over a
particular class of cases does not make that particular
class of cases arise under federal law any more than the
diversity jurisdiction statute makes a $100,000 breach of
contract suit between a Massachusetts corporation and a
Maine citizen ‗arise under‘ federal law.‖ Sarei, 671 F.3d
at 820 (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
The ATS‘s purely jurisdictional nature forecloses the
argument that tort suits between aliens ―arise under‖ the
jurisdictional statute itself.
2. This Court should also reject any argument that
ATS claims ―arise under‖ federal law because ―the law of
nations‖ is part of the ―Laws of the United States.‖8
When the ATS was enacted, the First Congress did not
understand the law of nations to constitute federal common law:
Federal common law is a modern construct. Prior
to the twentieth century, courts did not recognize
federal rules of decision whose content cannot be
traced by traditional methods of interpretation to
federal statutory or constitutional commands. To
8

This erroneous approach was adopted by the Second Circuit in
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980), in which
two citizens of Paraguay sued another Paraguayan national for torturing their son in Paraguay. As discussed below, this approach is
anachronistic and lacks a convincing basis in the historical record.
Moreover, none of the cases relied on in Filartiga involved questions
of ―arising under‖ jurisdiction. Bellia & Clark, Common Law of Nations 63–75, 84–90.
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be sure, federal courts applied certain rules derived from the law of nations in the exercise of
their Article III jurisdiction—particularly their
admiralty and foreign diversity jurisdiction. They
did not apply such rules, however, because they
constituted a form of supreme federal law.
Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute 547–48 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bellia &
Clark, Common Law of Nations 37–41; Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 Va. J. Int‘l
L. 587, 597–616 (2002); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv.
L. Rev. 815 (1997).
This approach has been followed by the Supreme
Court. As Judge Ikuta explained in her dissent in Sarei:
[A] series of subsequent Supreme Court decisions
establish[ ] that cases presenting questions of international law do not arise under the laws of the
United States for purposes of Article III. See
Caperton v. Bowyer, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 216, 228
(1871) (―It is said that [the plea] involves a question of international law. If it does, this can give
this court no jurisdiction. The law of nations is
not embodied in any provision of the Constitution,
nor in any treaty, act of Congress, or any authority, or commission derived from the United
States.‖); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92
U.S. 286, 286–87 (1875) (holding that the court
lacked jurisdiction to hear a case involving ―the
general laws of war, as recognized by the law of
nations applicable to this case,‖ because ―it [was]
nowhere appearing that the constitution, laws,
treaties, or executive proclamations, of the United
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States were necessarily involved in the decision.‖); American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton,
26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 545 (1828) (―A case in admiralty does not, in fact, arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States.‖).
671 F.3d at 823 (Ikuta, J., dissenting); see also Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886) (Supreme Court had ―no
right to review‖ the decision of an Illinois court regarding
―a question of common law, or the law of nations‖); Bellia
& Clark, Common Law of Nations 39–41.
In short, ―[e]ven if the law of nations was considered a
form of general common law, it was not understood to be
supreme federal law inherently capable of either
preempting state law or supporting ‗arising under‘ jurisdiction in federal court.‖ Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute 528 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). Consequently, such law cannot support federal question jurisdiction for alien-versus-alien lawsuits under the ATS.
*

*

*

As Sosa confirmed, the ATS ―is in terms only jurisdictional.‖ 452 U.S. at 712. It did not create a federal cause
of action or adopt the law of nations as a matter of federal
law. Such steps were unnecessary in 1789 because diversity jurisdiction was enough to give aliens a federal forum
in which to pursue tort claims against American citizens,
and to fully satisfy the United States‘ obligations under
the law of nations to redress the misconduct of its citizens
toward aliens. Reading the ATS as an exercise of foreign
diversity jurisdiction also accords with the reasons for
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―great caution‖ identified by this Court in rejecting an
expansive interpretation of the statute.9
III. This Case Is The Proper Vehicle For Deciding
Whether The ATS Covers Suits Between Aliens.
1. When Sosa reached this Court, it involved ATS
claims only among Mexican nationals. However, Sosa did
not address—much less answer—whether the ATS
grants jurisdiction over suits between aliens, or whether
such jurisdiction comports with Article III. That question remains open and is ripe for decision by the Court in
this case.
First, the Sosa Court had no need to consider the
question of party alignment given its conclusion that the
plaintiff there had failed to allege a tort ―in violation of
the law of nations‖ under the ATS. 542 U.S. at 727.
In addition, the jurisdictional issue was not cleanly
presented in Sosa because the district court had independent constitutional and statutory bases for subject
matter jurisdiction. The court had jurisdiction over
plaintiff‘s original claims against the United States under
the Federal Tort Claims Act and over the claims against
the DEA agents under the foreign diversity statute. Because the claims against the Mexican defendant shared a
9

Restricting the ATS to torts committed by U.S. citizens would minimize ―the potential implications for the foreign relations of the United States.‖ Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727. And limiting its coverage to ordinary intentional torts of force—of the kind that have been recognized
and routinely litigated for centuries—would avoid embroiling the
courts in creating a new federal common law of ―international‖ offenses. See id. at 728 (courts ―have no congressional mandate to define new and debatable violations of the law of nations‖).
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common nucleus of operative fact with the claims against
the U.S. defendants, the federal courts had supplemental
jurisdiction even after the claims against the U.S. defendants were dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725
(1966).
In short, the Sosa Court did not decide—and had no
need to decide—whether the ATS permits a suit between
aliens in order to hold that the claims in that case were
outside the scope of the statute. This means that the
Court is free to address—and resolve—it here. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 535 n.5 (―[W]hen questions
of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions sub
silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound
when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional
issue before us.‖).
2. The Sosa Court itself questioned whether certain
alien-alien claims arising abroad ever could be brought in
federal court under the ATS. Specifically, it questioned
whether ATS jurisdiction ever could extend to suits that
―claim a limit on the power of foreign governments over
their own citizens‖ and that seek ―to hold that a foreign
government or its agent has transgressed those limits.‖
542 U.S. at 727–28. Because such suits could have ―adverse foreign policy consequences,‖ the Court stressed
that ATS jurisdiction ―should be undertaken, if at all,
with great caution.‖ Id. at 728 (emphasis added).
3. Unlike Sosa, this case squarely presents the statutory and constitutional questions of whether the ATS covers a lawsuit solely between aliens. The plaintiffs and
defendants are all aliens; no American citizen or corporation has ever been a party.
Moreover, if the Court decides that the ATS does not
apply to suits between aliens, it is unlikely that it will ev-

31
er need to resolve the question of corporate liability under the statute. Pursuant to the diversity statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1332, federal courts already have jurisdiction
over suits by aliens against American corporations where
the amount in controversy is greater than $75,000. Thus,
aliens would have to rely on the ATS only in the unlikely
event that they were suing a U.S. corporation for less
than $75,000. Claims over that amount would proceed
identically regardless of whether the claims were brought
under the ATS or under foreign diversity jurisdiction.
However, if the Court declines to address the subject
matter jurisdiction issue here, the question will remain
open and will almost certainly require resolution by this
Court. For example, in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d
736 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), an en banc panel of the
Ninth Circuit sharply divided on this question. Judge
Ikuta—in a dissent joined by Judges Kleinfeld, Callahan,
and Bea—argued that federal courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction over claims between aliens. Id. at 818–34
(Ikuta, J., dissenting). Similarly, in Mwani v. United
States, a Magistrate Judge recently stayed proceedings
in an ATS case to await, among other things, whether Kiobel addresses the question of whether the ATS extends
to claims against aliens. No. 99-125 (JMF), 2012 WL
78237 (D.D.C. Jan 10, 2012). Indeed, if the Court were to
decide here that corporations may be liable under the
ATS, the jurisdictional question would remain open on
remand to the Second Circuit. See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y&H
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006) (―The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised
by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage
in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment.‖) (citation omitted). Considerations of certainty
and judicial economy counsel in favor of resolving the
subject matter jurisdiction issue now rather than later.

32
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should hold that
the ATS does not extend to cases between aliens and affirm the decision of the Second Circuit on that basis.
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